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… I say unto you, Swear not at all; … 
— Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5, 34) 
I swear … that to the best of my knowledge (which is pretty 
poor and may be revised in future), my company’s accounts 
are (more or less) accurate. I have checked this with my 
auditors and directors who (I pay) to agree with me. 
— The Economist, 17 August 2002. 
1.  Introduction 
In the wake of the Enron and Worldcom financial scandals that rocked Wall 
Street in 2002, the US government’s financial regulatory body, the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) took the unprecedented step in June 2002 of 
requiring that the chief executives (CEO) and chief financial officers (CFO) of 
America’s 947 biggest companies1 to swear in front of a notary that ‘to the best of 
my knowledge’, their latest annual and quarterly reports neither contain an ‘untrue 
statement’ nor omit any ‘material fact’ relevant to investors. Although the order 
was a one-off, it was quickly followed by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxely act 
which was rushed into law just over a month later. This law will require many 
more CEOs and CFOs to certify at regular intervals that their reports and financial 
statements contain no untruths or omit material facts.2 
————— 
* We would like to thank Winand Emons and other participants at the Hamburg Law and 
Economics Workshop, 14 February 2003, for comments. 
1 Companies with annual revenues of more than $1.2 billion. 
2 For background, see The Economist (17.08.02) and www.cfo.com: ‘I Solemnly Swear …’ 
(05.08.02) and ‘Is Signing Certifiable’ (05.08.02). 
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The move by the SEC and US law makers was obviously an attempt reduce 
volatility in the financial markets by finding a means to reassure an increasingly 
sceptical public that company bosses are an honest bunch. Not all of them were 
extracting $6,000 gold-and-burgundy floral-patterned shower curtains on their 
expense accounts as one executive was doing, or like the CEOs of Enron and 
Worldcom claiming that they had no idea that their staff were fiddling the books. 
By issuing an order to swear on oath and regularly certify their accounts the 
regulatory authority and the law maker was introducing a powerful incentive to be 
honest. Perjury, or lying under oath, is a criminal offence with severe penalties. 
Some commentators have speculated that CEOs and CFOs who falsely certify 
their company’s financials could, in the most egregious of case, be faced by fines 
of up to $5 million and 20 years jail.3 
The SEC’s one-off ruling and the Sarbanes-Oxely act raise two questions. The 
first is obviously whether or not swearing oaths will actually make company 
bosses tell the truth and prevent exploitation of investors; the second is whether it 
is a socially desirable mechanism even if it could elicit the truth. This paper deals 
with the second question; but in doing so we presume (maybe wrongly) that the 
first question is answered positively: we take it that perjury is an effective 
incentive to tell the truth if one decides to swear on oath. 
To answer the second question it is necessary to turn it around a little and ask, 
what value is the truth that is to be elicited by swearing on oath? In this particular 
case, the aim seems to be one of increasing the amount of trust that investors have 
in corporate bosses – trust that these bosses will not bankrupt the company and 
embezzle its funds by hiding expense accounts for shower curtains. And the value 
of trust is, of course, that it reduces transaction and monitoring costs. As Arrow 
(1974: 23) remarked, ‘Trust is an important lubricant of the social system’.4 
Thus we can ask, will such an order for CEOs and CFOs to certify under oath 
as to the veracity of their company reports and financial statements increase in the 
aggregate the amount of trust in the economy and lead to an increase in social 
welfare? 
————— 
3 ‘I Solemnly Swear …’ (05.08.02), www.cf.com 
4 Note that the value of trust for the economy was recognized by Adam Smith (1776 [1981]: 
66) in The Wealth of Nations, where he noted that trust is rewarded in wages. 
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We answer the question by recourse to a very simple signalling model. We 
take it that it is fairly self-evident that an oath is a quality signal, although one of a 
special kind, which we call an institutionalized signal. This is a signal which is 
enforced by law or convention. It has the characteristic that non-compliance with 
an order to send the signal can also convey important information to the recipient. 
For, not swearing on oath is a signal itself and will, under certain circumstances, 
be interpreted negatively by its recipients: in this case investors who will take it to 
indicate that something is awry with the company and therefore pull their capital 
out of the company before it is too late. It appears that this is precisely what the 
SEC and the Sarbanes-Oxley act are trying to achieve: a separating equilibrium in 
which honest bosses swear on oath while (as a simplification) dishonest ones do 
not (or at least have to restate its results before doing so5). That is, sworn 
certification is a sorting mechanism for investors to determine which companies 
are taking their responsibilities as a fiduciary seriously and are acting in the 
interests of shareholders. The result that we arrive at is that this form of 
institutionalized signalling can have a twofold effect that run contrary to its 
apparent raison d'être: it can reduce both the amount of trust and social welfare.6 
2.  Socially Harmful Signalling 
2.1  The Basic Model 
Our model is a simple three stage game in which a firm and investor meet and 
decide on an investment contract. In order to demonstrate our main thesis, that 
institutionalized signals such as requiring the CEO or CFO or a firm to swear on 
oath as to the veracity of the firm’s book-keeping can reduce trust and social 
welfare we keep our model as simple as possible and allow asymmetric 
information into the model only in two minimal respects. This will be sufficient to 
produce our result of the existence of an inefficient separating equilibrium. 
————— 
5 In the model that follows, we take restatement of company results prior to swearing on oath 
to their veracity as not sending the signal. 
6 This result differs from the literature in that in most signalling games such as Spence (1973, 
1974), Camerer (1988), Carmichael and MacLeod (1997), and Bolle (2001), and others the 
resulting equilibria are investigated, but not the question of whether the introduction of the signal 
is beneficial. 
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Our game has two players: a firm (F) and an investor (I). The firms are of two 
principle types: they are either honest or exploit. We assume that there is only one 
type of investor. This is simplifying assumption, as it says that each firm faces a 
population of investors with the same payoff function, i.e. its payoff’s (  
depend on the firm and not his or her own type. We do not believe this 
assumption to be too severe in the context of the question we seek to answer. 
 and  ) II uy
We also assume that transaction costs make legal enforcement of the contract 
infeasible – this is the essential element in a trust relationship.7 And finally, we 
make the usual assumption of players having von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions and being risk neutral, i.e. they want to maximize expected income. 
The difference between the types of firms is characterized  by the payoff. 
Honest firms are precisely those whose payoff from holding to the terms of the 
investment contract is greater than that of breaching the contract and embezzling 
the surplus at the expense of the  investor. If this game of trust is one of full 
information, the equilibrium outcome is trivial: only matches between investors 
and honest firms come into being. Signalling is naturally irrelevant here. Where it 
becomes relevant is of course where the game is one of incomplete information. 
We introduce this in a minimal way by making the firm’s type (what its payoff 
happens to be) private information. All that the investor knows is the distribution 
of types, and not whether a particular firm is trustworthy; put another way, from 
the investor’s point of view, the firm’s profits and costs functions are drawn from 
a certain distribution. 
The introduction of an institutional signal changes the game of trust in one 
very important respect. If the signal is sufficiently costly (which is the main 
feature of our model), which we assume to be the case, in that the probability of 
detection and costs punishment for imitating the signal (making a false oath) are 
sufficiently high as to always deter an exploiter (type E) from sending the signal, 
then investors will usually prefer to make a match with a firm that has sent the 
————— 
7 Here we follow, in particular, Coleman (1991: 91) in taking situations involving ‘trust’ to 
refer to constitute a sub-class of those involving risk; situations in which the risk one takes 
depends on the performance of another actor. That is, trust is essentially a game theoretic and not 
a classical decision-theoretic problem. See also Coleman (1984). For a discussion of this notion of 
‘trust as risk’, see Dasgupta (1988) and Williamson (1993) and the references therein. For more 
general background, see the contributions in Gambetta (1988). 
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signal than with one that has not. That is, if a signal is an unfakeable cue, a 
strategic problem is now imposed on the firms: to invest in the signal or not. 
Thus once a signal is instituted, an honest firm can be honest and wealthy 
(type H) – it can afford the signal; or honest and poor (  – it cannot afford 
the signal.8 The latter case is one in which expected profit of a match with an 
investor are now offset by the cost of the signal to such an extent that the outside 
option of zero, which we assume results if an investor does not decide on a match, 
is preferable to sending the signal and obtaining a match. Thus, we have a 
situation in which firms can discern only honest and wealthy firms (type H) but 
not between honest and poor   and the exploiters (type E). However, 
whether or not a firm can afford the signal has no effect upon the investor’s 
payoff; it only affects the firm’s; an investor receives the same payoff for trusting 
an honest firm regardless of the firm’s ability to cover the cost of the signal. 
type  ) H 
(type  ) H 
The structure of the game is summarized by Figure 1. The sequence of play 
and the payoffs are as follows: 
Stage 1  Nature randomly determines the type of firm on the basis of a 
continuous, strictly increasing distribution function, i.e. a firm’s u ,  , and c  
are random variables. Where u and y designate payoffs and c the cost of the signal 
(subscripts F and I refer to firms and investors respectively). Firms know their 
type; investors do not know it, although they know the proportion of honest and 
exploiting firms in the total pool of firms. 
F F y F
Stage 2  Firms decide to send a signal (S) or not (NS). 
Stage 3  The selected type of firm and the investor meet. The investor determines 
whether or not to trust (T) the firm. If she does not trust (NT), both receive a 
payoff of zero and the game is terminated. If she trusts, the game proceeds to 
stage 3. 
Stage 4  The firm decides to cooperate and fulfil (C) the terms of the investment 
contract or not (NC). If the firm is honest, the investor receives a payoff of   and  I u
————— 
8 Note that the attributions ‘wealthy’ and ‘poor’ are not to be taken literally. They only mean 
that from the firm’s point of view it is optimal or suboptimal to send the signal. This has to do 
with the specific profits and costs that are involved in the firm’s (the executive’s) decision to send 
the signal or not. 
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Figure 1 
the firm a payoff of  ; if the firm is an exploiter, it breaches the contract and 
embezzles the investor’s money giving the investor a payoff   and himself a 




F y F y F F u , , 0 IFF uu y> c <  and  . 
We further assume that firms’ profits and costs are private knowledge and that the 
investors profits are constant  and common knowledge. Firms with u  are 
‘honest’ (type H or  ); firms with u
0 I y <
F y F >
H 
F y F <  are ‘exploiters’ (type E). 
2.2  No-oath Equilibria 
As we have explained, we want to show that the institutionalization of a signal 
can, paradoxically, decrease trust and cause a welfare loss even though the 
proportion of trustworthy firms remains unchanged. To do this, we first consider 
the case of there being no institutionalized signal, i.e. firms are neither required by 
law or convention (social norms) to swear on oath as to the veracity of their book 
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keeping nor do they have the possibility to do so voluntarily by some means.9 
This is obviously an extreme assumption and does not reflect the reality of any 
legal order. But we consider this as our baseline scenario. 
If in this baseline scenario investors trust firms, the situation is the same as a 
pooling equilibrium in the signalling game of Figure 1 in which no firm sends a 
signal and all investors trust and invest or no investor trusts (and makes do with 
the outside option of zero). Let V be the expected value of an investor’s trust 
without a signal: 
() () () () I VP HP H u P E y =+⋅ + 
I ⋅  (1) 
With  ,  ,  ( ) Pr( ) FF PH u c => ()P r ( ) FFF PH c u y => >  ( ) Pr( ) FF PE u y = < . 
(Remember the generally true relation  F yc F <  which is also known by the 
investors.) 
Proposition 1 (No Signalling)   If no signalling is possible and V , then all 
investors trust (T) and no firm sends a signal (NS); if V
0 >
0 < , then no investor 
trusts (NT). If signalling is possible and V , then sending no signal (NS) and 
trusting (T) is a pooling equilibrium; if V
0 >
0 <  such a pooling equilibrium does 
not exist. 
(Without proof.) 
Remark 1   Only for certain parameter values will (1) be an equality. If these 
parameters are randomly chosen, then V 0 = only with a probability zero. We do 
not consider this (non-generic) case further. 
In words, investors will trust – take a risk – if either there are a sufficient 
number of trustworthy firms in the population, or the payoff from investing in a 
trustworthy firm is large enough even though there is a positive probability of 
being exploited. 
————— 
9 We assume that conventions can be as authoritative as formal law. This assumption is in line 
with Basu’s (Basu 2000: 117) ‘core theorem of law and economics’: ‘Whatever behavior and 
outcomes in society are legally enforceable are also enforceable through social norms’. 
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Given that we ultimately wish to compare two institutional arrangements, one 
without signalling and one with, we need compare the social value of each 
arrangement. For this we assume a simple utilitarian social welfare function, W 
(the case of all firm types being trusted without signals) given by: 
( ) () ( ) () ( ) () H H
IF IF IF W P H u uP H u uP E y y =+ ++ ++
  E  (2) 
Note that in the case of the pooling equilibrium described by Proposition 1, 
H
F u  and  H
F u
  and  are mean values as defined by H,  , and E. The other payoffs 
are assumed by the model setup to be constant. We will make use of (2) in section 
2.3 below. 
F c H 
2.3  Oath Equilibria 
Our next step is to investigate the conditions and implications of sending an 
institutionalized signal such as an oath attesting to the veracity of a firms 
accounts. The idea of this instrument is obviously to obtain a separating 
equilibrium in which all honest firms send the signal and the dishonest ones do 
not. If they can, all investors will make a match with honest firms and social 
welfare can increase because the losses accruing to investors being exploited will 
now be eradicated. It is obvious that we are almost guaranteed an efficient 
outcome if all honest firms can in fact send the signal (it is not too costly to do so) 
and the exploiters can never send the signal (it is too costly). Put another way, if 
the signal is cheap but unfakeable because the consequences of detection are too 
severe,10 the introduction of an institutionalised signal will have the desired 
effect.11 
However, matters change significantly in the presence of substantial signalling 
costs,   (with the addition of a H or   superscript where relevant). The  F c H 
————— 
10 It could be disputed that unfakeable (or unimitable) signals cannot be cheap; if they were 
they could not be unfakeable. In particular this is a position taken with regard to animal signalling 
in evolutionary biology, known as the ‘handicap principle’ (Zahavi 1975, Krebs and Dawkins 
1984). However, in our context it would seem possible. Consider the one-man firm. He knows 
with certainty whether or not he has fiddled the figures or not and betrayed the confidence of his 
investors. Certifying his accounts will be relatively cheap (essentially only the costs of the notary 
services). In contrast, a huge multinational corporation the same act – certifying on oath – will be 
extremely costly as it requires an elaborate accounting, reporting, and monitoring mechanism. 
11 If no investor would trust without a signal, it is certainly efficient to institutionalize a one. 
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signalling cost in the particular case that we are examining here is not only the 
actual outlay on procuring the signal, e.g. additional auditing and legal costs in the 
case of swearing that the firm has not engaged in ‘erroneous book keeping’ plus 
the opportunity cost of executives having to scrutinize company reports,12 but also 
the cost of a false accusation of lying on oath. Perjury is a severe criminal offence 
in most countries. As we already said in the introduction, the punishment in the 
US for a corporate boss who falsely swears to the accuracy of his company 
accounts is estimated to be in the region of $5 million and 20 years imprisonment 
in the most severe of cases. It is vital to note that in our model we are not merely 
concerned with the expected loss due to the (in reality) rather small probability of 
a judicial error which ends up wrongly convicting a senior executive for perjury, 
but also the expected loss derived from an unsubstantiated accusation which may 
severely undermine a high ranking executive’s reputation for trustworthiness and 
hence his or her future stream of income, a probability that in reality may not be 
negligible. So long as investors are aware that a lack of proof of embezzlement is 
not necessarily evidence of being honest, then being accused of dishonesty may 
have serious repercussions even though one is in fact honest. It comes as no 
surprise to us that given the seriousness of perjury, legal experts were advising 
executives not to make the oaths (particularly as it was still unclear what the legal 
sanctions would be for not doing so).13 The point being that if the financial market 
cognoscenti take the missing paperwork as a sign that something may be amiss 
with a company and hammer it on the belief that it has something to hide, for the 
honest executive this may still be better than being falsely accused of lying under 
oath (even without it leading to a false conviction). 
Now, the separating equilibrium can be inefficient compared to the no oath 
arrangement as the honest group for whom the cost is too high will not send the 
signal and therefore will not necessarily find a match with an investor. To see that 
————— 
12 For example, shortly after the SEC issued the order in June, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, 
Scott McNealy, complained that compliance would force him to spend valuable time scrutinizing 
financial statements instead of drumming up business by visiting customers. See, ‘Is Signing 
Certifiable’, www.cfo.com (05.08.02). 
13 See, ‘Is Signing Certifiable’, www.cfo.com (05.08.02). Consider the risk that a chief 
executive faces if the Economist’s caricature of oath-taking which we gave in the epigraph of this 
essay would not be so far from reality. The lack of knowledge that a senior executive has indicates 
just how costly swearing on oath may be. 
9 
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this is equilibrium behaviour (for the investor to play NT), an investor will not 
trust in absence of a signal if the expected value of trust V′ is: 
() ()
0












We now can state the following simple proposition: 
Proposition 2 (Signalling)  If, for all    E
F y, E
F yc < , and defining the 
probabilities in (3) as in (1), then we have three cases: 
Case I  If (1) and (3) hold then we have two equilibria: (a) a pooling equilibrium 
in which all investors trust (T) and  no firm signals (NS) – do not sign the oath; 
and (b) a separating equilibrium in which investors only trust (T) those firms 
which send the signal so that only type H firms signal (S) – sign the oath – and 
types   and  E do not send the signal (NS).  H 
Case II  If only (1) holds we have a pooling equilibrium (equivalent to 
Proposition 1). 
Case III  If only (3) holds we have a separating equilibrium (as in Case I(b)). 
Proof  It is easily checked that given the behaviour of others, it is optimal to 
stick with the behaviour described in each case in the proposition. Note that 
 implies V  so that there is no fourth case. If  , then the 
separating equilibrium is intrinsically a pooling equilibrium without signalling 
(NS) and without trust (NT).   
0 V′> 0 > ()0 PH =
Remark 2  In Case I there is also a third, mixed strategy equilibrium (Bolle 
2002), but we do not investigate it here. Also note, that for our purposes, Case I is 
the interesting case. Although from a game theoretic point of view we have two 
equilibria, from a behavioural point of view we are likely only to have the pooling 
equilibrium because it does not pay for a single firm to send the signal. That is, 
the separating equilibrium can only be instituted from the outside. 
Now, in order to demonstrate our claim oaths can be inefficient, we define 
social welfare under institutional signals, W′, as: 
10 
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() ( ) H H
IFF WP H uuc ′ =+ −  (4) 
The relative efficiency of the two systems can be assessed by the differences 
in welfare, ∆, which is given by: 
() ( ) () ( ) () H EH
IF IF
WW
PH u u PE y y PHc
′ ∆= −
=+ ++ +
   (5) 
The following proposition is straightforward: 
Proposition 3 (Inefficiency)  There exist separating signalling equilibria that 
are inefficient with respect to the no signalling pooling equilibrium. 
Proof  By example. Assume  1
3 () () () PH PH PE = ==  and (1), (3), and  the 




FFF cccC === >
 ;  ;  1,  2 1 II uy =− << − 1
3 1,  ,   HH E
FF F uuy 1
3 = ==
 . Plugging 
Plugging these values into (5), we obtain  0 ∆ >  for  5
3
H
FF yc >− − .14   
Remark 3  Note that for  5
3 1 I y −< < − the separating equilibrium is inefficient 
even in the absence of signalling costs  H
F c . What this implies, then, is that 
signalling costs are important for efficiency, but not decisive. The social product 
can be sufficiently reduced by a deterioration in trust alone (trustworthy firms nit 
finding a match). Note, therefore, that the result is not driven by the size but only  
the function of the signalling costs.  
Intuitively, if the signal is unaffordable for some firms, then the effect of the 
signal is to raise the conditional probability that an unmatched investor will end 
up with an exploiter once all firms that could afford the signal have found a 
match. This can lead to a social loss even without taking into account the price of 
the signal for those who could afford it. For a more light-hearted example, 
consider the case of six men and six women. Men can be ‘husbands’ who want a 
long-term relationship (‘until death do us part’) or ‘Latin lovers’ (‘here today, 
gone tomorrow’). Women are ‘wives’: they prefer husbands to Latin lovers. 
Imagine now that husbands can be distinguished by gifts of diamond engagement 
rings (‘diamonds are woman’s best friend). Latin lovers would never make such 
————— 
14 Note that the bounds on  I y  are required to satisfy (1). 
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an investment (far too expensive for fleeting romance). Now assume further that 
there are four ‘husbands’ and two Latin lovers, but only two husbands can afford 
a diamond ring; call those who cannot afford diamonds ‘bachelors’ (i.e. willing 
but unsuccessful ‘husbands’). If the convention is to give diamond engagement 
rings, then there are only two matches; the two other men with good intentions 
and the two other women who want a husband go without a pairing, although both 
couples would prefer this. However, without the convention of diamond 
engagement rings, we would have four matches: all well intentioned men 
(husbands + bachelors) who want a wife get one, even though two unlucky 
women have to suffer the consequences the morning after … On the whole 
society will be better off without the institutionalized signal of diamond 
engagement rings (and possibly engagement tout à fait if it is an expensive 
custom) as long as the utility losses of the two women who end up with Latin 
lovers does not exceed the collective gains of the four pairs and the two men they 
end up with.15 
The interesting feature of this marriage-market example is that it shows there 
need not be a social loss involved in the act of signalling itself even if it reduces 
trust: giving a diamond ring only means a transfer of the social loss.16 
3.  Discussion 
The basic result of this paper says that for two societies which are alike in all 
respects bar the presence of an institutionalized signal in one but not the other, 
will have different levels of social welfare as measured by the social product (W). 
The importance is that they both have the equivalent amount of trustworthy 
individuals, but not the equivalent amount of trust, i.e. individuals who are willing 
to take a risk that another will actually perform what they have agreed to in 
circumstances where the agreement cannot easily be enforced by legal means. 
This can be sufficient to lower the social product even before taking into account 
the reduction brought about by those who have actually invested in the cost of the 
signal. To give more of a paradoxical flavour to the result, our model also shows 
————— 
15 This marriage game is analysed in more detail in Bolle (2001). See also Camerer (1988) 
16 Assuming, of course, a model with only ‘wives’; there is no ‘reverse exploitation’ in which 
‘virigins’ collect diamond rings. 
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that it is quite possible that one society has more trustworthy individuals than 
another ( ) but has less trust and a lower social 
product. Whether this will occur obviously depends on how large   
is in general, and more specifically the value of  . If trust is – in Arrow’s 
words again – ‘an important lubricant of the social system’, then instituting a 
signalling mechanism can be the spanner in the works!17 
11 2 () () () ( PH PH PH PH +>+ 
2 ) 
————— 
( ) ( ) PH PH + 
( ) PH 
To phrase the result in another way, relations of trust have two components: a 
trustee and a trustor. What our model shows is that being a trustworthy trustee (a 
trustee upon whom a trustor can rely to implement the terms of an agreement 
without external sanctions) is not a sufficient condition to be trusted. The 
placement of trust is affected by the probability of encountering a trustworthy 
trustee in a random matching and by the institutional environment governing 
signals of trustworthiness. These signals are costly, with the result that if 
instituted in an environment with a sufficiently large proportion of trustworthy 
individuals who cannot afford the signal, then the signal can be counter 
productive. Thus, to take the case which motivated this paper, the SEC ruling that 
CEO’s and CFO’s swear on oath that their business accounts are accurate will 
certainly increase reliability and trust of those who give the oath; but there may be 
a large number of managers who, in principle, are trustworthy but who are not 
ready to take the risk of the oath. As not signing the oath is a negative signal 
under these circumstances, not only corrupt but also reliable companies will suffer 
a loss of trust. In aggregate this may or may not increase efficiency (the social 
product). In a nutshell, the aggregate amount of trust in an economy is not 
monotone in the aggregate amount of trustworthiness. 
One of the interesting features of our result is that it is applicable to a wide 
range of phenomena. Institutionalized signalling is as much a matter of social 
conventions as legal rules and regulations. Our marriage market example is a case 
in point. Another example is the job market. In countries such as Germany, one 
can only set up a business as a baker, butcher, carpenter, electrician, etc., if one 
has a Meisterbrief, which is a certificate of ‘Master Craftsmanship’. This is 
clearly a quality signal in the sense of Spence’s (1973, 1974) classic study. 
17 It is interesting to note that in a very simple experimental set up of a marriage market based 
on this theoretical set up of this paper, Bolle and Kaehler (2002) have been able to confirm that 
that behaviour is fairly consistent with our model so that the use of gifts as a signal of being a 
honest can reduce trust (‘marriages’) and the social product. 
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Although it is a basic feature of Spence’s model that signalling (separating) 
equilibria could be Pareto inferior, his reason was different to ours. In his model, 
the inefficiency arises when one tries to increase the level of education and 
training (the signal) above a threshold amount such that it does not improve the 
quality of sorting by applicants by employers by one bit. In our model, the 
inefficiency arises if there are able employees who cannot afford the signal; or in 
the case of Germany, able craftsmen who cannot afford to purchase a training that 
leads to Meisterbrief. In this latter case not only do able craftsmen who are not 
permitted to setup business suffer, so to do the consumers as the supply of 
craftsmen and competition is reduced leading to a higher equilibrium price. The 
only ones who benefit are those privileged enough to be able to incur the sunk 
costs of their title. Consider the loss to the economy because able managers are 
unable to purchase an MBA from an appropriate business school. It does not take 
much of a stretch to the imagination to see that the model applies to a whole range 
of social practices related to the acquisition of status that determines entry into 
various job markets.18 
In short, what we have shown is that while it is true that if a signal is a 
sufficiently expensive and unfakeable cue, it entails that the sender possesses a 
particular quality, it is not true that the absence of a signal entails non-possession 
of the quality. Clearly this is a logically trivial conclusion; but its implications for 
institutional design are not. So, for instance, when it is observed that ‘among the 
properties of many societies whose economic development is backward is a lack 
of mutual trust’ (Arrow 1974: 26) it should not be concluded that these societies 
lack the institutions and rules for signalling trustworthiness. The fact is, these 
societies may have too much signalling in the form of social customs and 
behavioural codes which prevent – in a mouthful – trustors trusting trustworthy 
trustees. 
As a caveat, it could be argued that our result is not particularly important 
because an evolutionary argument along the lines of Alchian (1950) would mean 
that either inefficient signalling institutions would not emerge, or if, by chance, 
they did, they would not persist for very long as inefficient behaviour and 
institutions are driven out by competition. This is not the place to examine the 
————— 
18 In this regard, our results touch upon complementary studies of the effects of social custom. 
See for example Akerlof (1976, 1980) and Basu (1989). 
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problem in detail, but we would like to state our position on it. We believe that an 
evolutionary mechanism may not necessarily drive out an inefficient signalling 
institution. If the different parties have different interests it seems to us quite 
possible that one side of the match prefers the inefficient separating equilibrium. 
If we take our quaint marriage market example again, it is plausible to conceive 
that women as a group would be better off with signalling (diamond engagement 
rings) while the men suffer. Thus women (or investors) may try, and succeed in, 
enforcing the signalling institution, although this is harmful for society as a 
whole. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
To tie up this paper, two main qualifications are in order. Firstly, our model is 
rudimentary: the only feature which really matters in signalling is its cost. Clearly 
this is unrealistic in many a context. Thus to return to the motivation of this paper, 
we do not claim that either the one-off SEC order that top executives personally 
certify company accounts or the Sarbanes-Oxley act which will require 
certification at regular intervals is inefficient. Our claim is weaker: neither the 
one-off oath nor Sarbanes-Oxley can guarantee a welfare improvement, as 
measured by the social product, W. To make the other claim would require a much 
richer model that takes into account many more legal and institutional details.19 
We were content only with determining whether or not it is always socially 
desirable to introduce an institutional signal such as oaths. Our answer is negative.  
Secondly, it must be remarked that we have treated institutional signals such 
as oaths as what can be termed as a signal simpliciter, that is, as an unmistakeable 
cue that serves to communicate information which can incite action or influence 
the behaviour of others. But this is only a partial understanding of what oaths are 
about. Oaths, in particular, are often far more than this: they can also be seen as 
preference changing signals. They can be seen as a commitment device which 
create the preference structure necessary for trustworthiness in advance of the 
decision to cooperate or exploit; call these ‘preference-shaping signals’. Clearly 
these signals have the characteristic of changing intrinsic and extrinsic costs and 
————— 
19 For example, the penalties for non-compliance. At the time of writing this was still unclear 
what this would be. 
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benefits. If an oath is costly, because breaking it is a criminal offence (law of 
perjury), can ruin our reputation, or merely because we will suffer a bad 
conscience because of the value system that we possess, it is a way of providing 
currency to our promises. In this context, if we have to take an oath – send an 
institutionalized signal – we have reasons for doing something in the future even 
though we may no longer want to do it. In this way an oath can  be seen as a way 
of creating trust and predictability in interpersonal relations.20 Thus if an 
executive knows that he has to certify his company’s accounts on oath, the 
incentives that come along with the severity of perjury can change an executive 
preferences from one of acting negligently (not reading the company accounts) to 
acting with due care and attention (reading the company accounts). What was one 
onerous may now be ‘pleasurable’. Clearly our result, that institutionalized 
signalling such as taking an oath, can easily be inefficient does not take into 
account this more subtle and complicated texture of signals. 
Finally, despite the rough cut of the model we do believe that the wedge that 
the result drives between the ‘amount of trustworthiness’ and the ‘amount of trust’ 
in a society is important enough to earn further theoretical speculation and 
empirical and experimental investigation. It certainly does not seem to be an 
obvious fact that an institution designed to signal the integrity of trading partners 
could lead to the withdrawal of trust and thus to a reduction in society’s welfare. 
This would appear to be particularly relevant to the institutional features of 
economic development and growth as well as to the more abstract study of the 
social organization of trust relations. 
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